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6 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Performance Evaluation and  
Improvement, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM : Eloise R. Page  
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff

SUBJECT : Draft Paper: "The Roles of the DCI..."  
(PRM-11, Task 2)

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum dated 27 April 1977,  
subject as above

The draft of the subject paper has been reviewed and we find it comprehensive and well written. Our comments are attached and are keyed to the specific pages and paragraphs of the draft paper. At your request we have not commented on editorial items. We should appreciate being allowed to coordinate on the final draft.

Eloise R. Page  
Eloise R. Page

Attachment:  
As Stated

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Page 5, second paragraph

Comment: The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) should be listed in this paragraph with the other departments and agencies. The DCI's Critical Collection Problems Committee addressed this problem in their September 1976 study entitled "Intelligence Activities Against Illicit Narcotics Traffic". This study was approved by the NFIB in January 1977. In addition, recommendations have been made to include DEA as part of the Intelligence Community. If the recommendation by the Justice Department Task Force to rewrite Executive Order 11905 is approved then DEA should be placed in the Intelligence Community in paragraph one, page 5.

Page 23, subparagraph c

Comment: This sentence is not clear and the follow on text does not amplify on what is meant by "less than full consideration by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)." The use of the phrase "...aiming for collective judgment..." tends to confuse it further since many interagency papers are designed to identify gaps on the issue being addressed.

Page 26, second paragraph

Comment: We believe that the procedure for making national intelligence inputs to major policy studies is well established and adequate, at least within CIA. A more identifiable problem may be that these procedures are not understood and/or followed which causes a proliferation of effort with an excessive number of individuals addressing segments of the issues under study. There should be a central focal point within each Agency for centralized control of the inputs to major policy studies.

Page 47, first paragraph

Comment: The question of the authorities of the Agency, and the DCI particularly, during war was raised when the National Security Council Intelligence Directives were being rewritten in 1976 subsequent to the promulgation of Executive Order 11905. In particular, NSCID 5 has a paragraph which in effect calls for the automatic takeover

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of the intelligence activities by the Secretary of Defense in time of war. An attempt was made at that time to rewrite this paragraph to allow CIA to operate independently. The DDO has submitted a paper, which also addresses this problem, entitled "Wartime and Contingency Planning Program" to the Executive Advisory Group for their consideration.

Page 67, subparagraph a, b, and c

Comment: We believe that a more detailed and expanded presentation of the three alternatives would add to the objectives of this paper.

Page 71, subparagraph d

Comment: The need for some kind of legislation to provide for the protection of intelligence sources and methods is one of the prime needs of the Intelligence Community.

Page 79, first paragraph

Comment: We have some concern over the wording in this paragraph relative to relationships with foreign intelligence and security organizations by departments and agencies within and outside the Intelligence Community. DCID No. 5/1 provides that the coordination of U.S. clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities abroad shall be the responsibility of the DCI. In addition, the coordination of these activities with respect to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services is specifically set forth as a DCI responsibility in DCID No. 5/2.

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Page 80, third paragraph

Comment: The presumption raised in this paragraph that State may collect information through "foreign liaison" needs to be clarified. Since NSCID 2 addresses itself to the Coordination of Overt Collection Activities, we assume that the draft paper is referring to the Department of State's overt contact with their counterparts within the various foreign offices abroad.

Page 90, second paragraph

Comment: It is believed that this paragraph is not pertinent to this paper and should be deleted.

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